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1

STAGNATION AND STEEL

THE EDITORS

MARXISM AND EXISTENTIALISM

ADAM SCHAFF

The Great Debate:

Articles by PAUL A. BARAN and PAUL M. SWEEZY

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NOTES FROM THE EDITORS

In 1957 we sent a questionnaire to our readers in an effort to find out "who you are." Among the results (published in the issue of April, 1958) which we learned was the age distribution of MR readers at that time: the largest group, roughly 45 percent, was in the 30 to 50 bracket; some 22 percent were between 50 and 65; 15 percent were over 65. Only 15.4 percent were under 30. Our guess is that young people under 30 constitute no large percentage of the readership of other left-wing periodicals, and unfortunately we have no reason to believe that any significant change has taken place in the age composition of our own readers. And yet it is painfully obvious that unless young people can be attracted in far larger numbers than in recent years, the Left faces a future of decline and defeat. In a way, our biggest job is to reach young people with the all-

(*continued on inside back cover*)

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STAGNATION AND STEEL

The current economic upswing, which got under way in March, 1961, is now just over a year old. On the whole it has been a sluggish affair, very much in the pattern of the preceding upswing (April '58 to May '60) which was the shortest and weakest of the postwar period. Comparing the first quarter of 1961 with the last quarter (the latest quarterly data available at the time of writing), we find that Gross National Product (GNP=total demand for goods and services) rose by $41.4 billion or 8.3 percent during the course of the year. This increase was made up as follows (in billions of dollars at annual rates):

	First Quarter 1961	Last Quarter 1961	Increase	Percent Increase
Gross National Product	500.8	542.2	41.4	8.3
Personal Consumption Expenditures	330.7	348.5	17.7	5.4
Gross Private Investment[a]	65.1	80.6	15.5	23.8
Gov't Purchases of Goods & Services	105.0	113.2	8.2	7.8

[a] Including net exports of goods and services

As usual in a cyclical upswing, the most dynamic factor has been private investment which during 1961 grew approximately three times as rapidly as government purchases and more than four times as rapidly as personal consumption. But also as usual, at least in all the cycles since the war, the major part of the expansion of private investment has been in inventories (i.e. stocks of materials and products in hand). During the first quarter of 1961 inventories were being used up more rapidly than they were being replaced at a rate of $4 billion a year; in the last quarter they were being *added to* at a rate of $5.3 billion a year. The effect of this sharp turnabout was to add $9.3 billion to total demand, which is some 55 percent of the total addition accounted for by private investment. Increases

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in private construction (including housing) and producer's durable goods, at $3.7 and $3.8 billion respectively, were very modest indeed.

In addition to investment in inventories, government purchases of goods and services have played an important role in the upswing, with the largest increase of course falling in the "national defense" category. The rate of military spending was stepped up by $4.5 billion from the first to the last quarter of 1961, after having already gone up $1.5 billion in the first quarter as compared to the last quarter of 1960. (The new Democratic administration cannot be accused of breaking *all* its campaign pledges: Kennedy promised that he would spend a lot more on armaments, and he has.) In the absence of this expansion of arms spending, with the federal cash deficit of $6.8 billion (calendar 1961) for which it was almost entirely responsible, it is quite conceivable that the total increase of GNP would have been no more and possibly less than half of what it actually was.* Left to itself, in other words, the United States economy is now almost wholly stagnant. An inventory upswing may be capable of pushing GNP up by 4 or 5 percent, to be followed in due course by a corresponding contraction. Since population is growing by nearly 2 percent a year, it seems safe to say that if it were not for increasing government outlays on armaments the long-run per capita growth rate (averaging the upswings and the downswings) would now be negative.

Even with a rising arms budget, the performance summarized above is anything but impressive. And if we judge it by comparison with what *could* be accomplished with existing capital equipment and labor force, the results are even more dismal.

There is no generally accepted index of capacity utilization, but no knowledgeable observer of the American scene

* Lest the reader think we exaggerate, we quote the following statement from the Council of Economic Advisers' *Annual Report to the President* (January, 1962): "A careful appraisal of the direct and indirect effects of increased federal activity indicates that it was a major force—probably the principal driving force—of the recovery of 1961." (P. 59.) What the Council tactfully omits is that most of this activity was in the military sphere.

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would question the statement of the Council of Economic Advisers in its *Annual Report to the President* that "considerable excess capacity remains in the economy despite the rapid rise of utilization rates during 1961." (P. 55.) A rough index computed by the Council shows a rise from about 78 percent utilization of capacity at the beginning of the year to something over 85 percent at the end, which may or may not justify the adjective "rapid" but in any case leaves plenty of leeway for more expansion. (Actually, wartime experience proved that the leeway is far greater than these figures would suggest, but there is no need to insist on the point in the present context.)

When it comes to unemployment, the situation is, if anything, even worse. Here there *is* a generally accepted measure, but it is almost equally generally admitted that it understates the magnitude of the problem. This measure showed unemployment as a percent of the civilian labor force to be 6.9 percent in February, 1961, and 5.6 percent in February, 1962. The true amount was certainly higher in both months (for example, the official figure makes no allowance for part-time idleness), but what is important from our present point of view is that there is reason to believe that the understatement was larger and may have been much larger this year than last. There is here involved an intriguing statistical puzzle.

Unemployment, of course, is the difference between the total number of people in the labor force and the number employed. If we abstract from the question of length of time worked, as the official figures do, there is no great difficulty in counting the number of employed workers. But the size of the labor force is a different matter. Is an able-bodied playboy who whiles away his time on the beaches of Miami and in the nightspots of Las Vegas in the labor force and hence to be counted as unemployed? What of a housewife who isn't looking for a job but would jump at a good offer if one came along? And how about a worker whose skills have been rendered obsolete by automation and has been turned down by so many employers in other lines of work that he has finally given up looking or even hoping for a new job? These examples could be multiplied; they show that the concept of the labor force is by no means an obvious or unambiguous one. Nevertheless,

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it is an indispensable one if we are to have any quantitative measure of unemployment. Two approaches to a solution of the problem suggest themselves. One is to attempt as far as possible to define the labor force by purely *objective* criteria. Taking the total noninstitutional population 14 years of age and over as a starting point, an attempt could be made to eliminate those and only those who are unemployable either by reason of incapacity (sick and aged, for example) or because they are otherwise occupied (students and soldiers, for example). This method, while taking care of the playboy and the worker who has given up looking for a job, does not solve the problem of the housewife. Here some sort of estimate would have to be made of the number of women who would be working provided suitable jobs were available. Though there would always be some imprecision about the boundaries of the labor force measured by these methods, nevertheless it would seem that a group of suitably chosen, disinterested experts ought to be able to come up with a reasonable solution to the problem. This, however, is not the approach which the government agencies concerned with labor force statistics have followed. Instead, they have chosen a definition of the labor force which rests entirely on *subjective* criteria. A person is in the labor force *at any given time* if and only if he considers himself to be, that is to say, if he is either at work or actively looking for a job on the day when the size of the labor force is being measured. This excludes the playboy, the housewife who is not seeking work, and the worker who has given up hope. It also makes it possible for the very same person to be in the labor force today and out tomorrow or vice versa: all he has to do is change his mind, and this of course may happen for any number of reasons. Now, what is particularly awkward about this is that by far the most important reason why people change their minds about working has to do with the availability of attractive jobs. Take the case of the housewife again: If she lives in an area of heavy unemployment, she knows that there would be no point in looking for a job no matter how willing she might be to work and no matter how much her family needs the additional income; she is not in the labor force. If, on the other hand, she happens to live in a boom-town, she may be lured

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out of the home by good pay and attractive working conditions even if she originally had no intention to work; she is in the labor force. What this means in more general terms is that the size of the labor force, measured by methods in official use today, is in no sense an objectively determinable variable, independent of the demand for labor, the volume of employment, or the state of the economy generally. It also means that one must be extremely cautious in interpreting unemployment statistics, both their absolute level at any point in time and their changes over a period of time.

Let us return now to developments during the current upswing. As already noted, the official unemployment rate (seasonally adjusted) dropped from 6.9 percent in February, 1961, to 5.6 percent in February, 1962. At the same time, however, a most unexpected thing happened. Based on known population trends and past experience of labor force participation rates, the Department of Labor expected the size of the labor force to grow by well over a million during this twelve-month period. The actual growth from February to February, as shown in the official statistics, was only 324,000. At the time of writing, we do not have the figures for March, but the latest issue of *Business Week* (April 14) indicates that the discrepancy is even more startling. We quote:

> The Labor Dept. regularly projects work force trends. These projections indicated a rise of 1.2 million over the past 12 months. Instead, there has been a shrinkage of 300,000, as shown in the monthly unemployment survey of the Census Bureau. Officials can't explain the drop.

What these figures tell us is that as of the present time approximately a million and a half persons who, on the basis of past experience, would be expected to be in the labor force have either never entered it or have dropped out. They certainly haven't emigrated to the moon or sunk to the bottom of the ocean. They are around somewhere, and our guess is that by any reasonably objective criteria most of them ought to be counted as unemployed. If we are right, the unemployment rate today would be somewhere between 7 and 8 percent, rather than the 5½ percent shown in the official statistics.

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The apparent improvement of the past year thus turns out to be an illusion; it is more likely that the unemployment situation has substantially worsened.

While we are on this subject, it may be well to point out that even these higher unemployment rates fail by a wide margin to indicate how much potentially employable manpower is not being utilized today. During the 1950's, the labor force participation rate—i.e. the proportion of the noninstitutional population 14 years old and over in the labor force—varied between 58 and 59 percent, and this has come to be regarded as "normal." But during the peak years of World War II, it rose to more than 63 percent. We do not suggest that this should in any sense be considered the norm; it does, however, show what is possible in an emergency. If the participation rate were 63 percent today, nearly six million workers would be added to the labor force, which is approximately a third more than the present number of unemployed. And if these additional workers plus the unemployed were combined with the country's idle (or partly idle) productive capacity, an expansion of output much greater than that achieved between 1940 and 1944 (60 percent in constant prices) could be realized in short order—much greater because in the earlier period millions of workers in the most productive age groups were drained off into the armed forces. The philosophers of the affluent society will, of course, laugh at such calculations: who wants to strain to produce as much as possible when we (or is it perhaps "they"?) already have everything we need? The ignorance betrayed by this argument is matched only by its moral callousness. There are tens of millions of people living in dire poverty right here in the United States, and on a world scale the number is between two and three billion. Is it laughable to ask what contribution our own country could make toward alleviating this situation if we were to mobilize our resources to feed the hungry, clothe the naked, care for the ailing, as we once mobilized our resources to fight a war? We believe that it is not laughable, and we believe too that the enormous gap between what we are producing and what we could produce, and hence what we could do to alleviate *unnecessary* human

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suffering and misery, should weigh like an alp on the conscience of every honorable American.

To summarize: The upswing which began in March, 1961, has been powered by two forces. The first is investment in inventories, which in the nature of the case is temporary and reversible; the second is an increase in arms spending, which is the only factor now tending to impart an upward trend to per capita GNP. The pace of the rise has been very moderate —too moderate, in fact, despite certain statistical appearances to the contrary, to prevent the serious unemployment situation of a year ago from getting worse. But the unemployment of today, great though it is, entirely fails to indicate the enormous unutilized potential of the American economy. If we were to mobilize our resources today as we did during World War II, we could achieve a far larger and more rapid expansion of output; and we could use the added output not for purposes of destruction but to alleviate the want and suffering of the vast majority of mankind.

Against this background, the furor over steel prices which has occupied the headlines for the best part of a week can be seen as the tempest in a teapot which it is.

Ever since the famous "Gary dinners" of the early 1900's, the steel industry has unquestioningly recognized the leadership of U.S. Steel, by far its largest member. This means that the management of U.S. Steel has been in a position to act exactly like the pure monopolist of economic theory, setting prices in such a way as to maximize profits over whatever time period Messrs. Gary and his successors have chosen to take into consideration in making their decisions. But in one very important respect the industry has been faced with a situation rather different from that usually assumed in the textbook cases of monopoly. It is usually assumed that if the monopolist raises his price beyond a certain relatively modest amount, his sales will fall off so much as to involve a reduction rather than an increase of profit. Naturally, the monopolist has no incentive to raise price beyond this level, and there is therefore no presumption that the existence of a monopoly implies a continuous rise in price of the monopolized commodities. Now, in the case of steel, which enters into thousands of products but usually

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as a relatively small element in their total cost, this natural ceiling on the monopoly price may be very high indeed; in other words, within very wide limits of price, the amount of steel bought will vary little, at least in the short run, which may be the only run the leaders of the industry are accustomed to thinking in terms of. Unlike most monopolists, therefore, the steel industry has an incentive to hike prices to an indeterminate extent. In practice, since it obviously has to avoid the odium of too blatant price gouging, this is likely to mean a policy of gradual but unremitting price increases.

This describes precisely the price policy of the steel industry, under U.S. Steel's leadership, since World War II. Whereas prices in general have gone up 40 percent since 1947, the price of steel has gone up well over 100 percent (steel wages have also risen faster than wages in general, but the discrepancy is much less marked). However, during the last three years, the industry has been plagued by increasing excess capacity, and price discipline behind U.S. Steel's leadership has been somewhat shaky. Under the circumstances, U.S. Steel apparently judged it unwise to attempt to put through further hikes: for all practical purposes the uptrend of steel prices came to a halt in 1958. To say that this was an unsatisfactory state of affairs from the industry's point of view is an understatement; for a long time now there has been an undertone of muttering from the steelmasters about the "need" for higher prices. What happened last week was that U.S. Steel decided the time had come to translate this muttering into action.

To understand what happened next, it is necessary to keep three things in mind. First, the Kennedy administration had just pressured the steel union into accepting a "noninflationary" contract with the industry, calling for no wage increase and only minor fringe benefits. Second, the demand for steel, having temporarily risen in anticipation of a possible summer strike, began to slump after the contract settlement and gave every sign of remaining in the doldrums for a long time to come; as a result, there was widespread doubt in business circles, inside as well as outside the steel industry, as to whether a price increase could be made to "stick." And third, many steel users, possessing excess capacity and faced with sluggish demand,

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would have found it impossible or unprofitable to pass on higher steel prices to their own customers and hence would have had to absorb the higher steel prices at the expense of their own profits. Add the fact that U.S. Steel, which still has a 19th-century attitude toward labor and government, not yet understanding that more is to be gained from uniting with them than from fighting against them, behaved provocatively and stupidly throughout, and you have more than enough reasons to explain why U.S. Steel and the heads of the other big companies that immediately followed its price lead found themselves in an isolated and untenable position—not only vis-à-vis Washington but also within the business community itself. All Kennedy had to do was persuade one or two of the major steel companies to break ranks and the discomfiture of Big Steel was complete. It seems probable that Inland and Kaiser, representatives inside the steel industry of "modern" Big Business views, were not unhappy about the chance to deal a blow to the prestige of U.S. Steel's management. This almost certainly does not mean that U.S. Steel's leadership in the industry is about to be challenged, but it may mean that the attitudes and policies of U.S. Steel, and hence of the rest of the industry, are going to be brought somewhat more up to date. Kennedy's victory is therefore not at all what it is being represented as, a victory of labor and/or the public over Big Business, but rather a victory of the "progressive" over the "reactionary" elements within Big Business itself.

Whether, and if so to what extent, this may lead to changes in business and government policies in the direction of more "planning" is not clear. The possibility of developments along this line is certainly not to be excluded, especially in view of the fact that it is getting to be more and more fashionable to attribute the vigor of the Western European economies in recent years to new forms of cooperation between Big Business and government.* However that may be, it seems quite

* See, for example, the long article entitled "Europe Charts Its Business Future" in *Business Week* for April 7th. The subtitle reads: "Business and government get together on planning to assure economic growth. France's Four-Year Plan is already started and Britain is following suit, spurred by industry." The article itself, however, does not suggest that there is much possibility that the United States will also follow suit.

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clear to us that neither the steel price increase nor its cancellation could have had or will have any significant influence on the functioning of the economy. Kennedy, of course, rode to battle against Big Steel under the banner of "No Inflation." But the truth is that inflation is simply not a problem in the United States today. During 1961, consumer prices rose by less than one percent, with almost the entire increase being accounted for by the "services" component; while wholesale prices actually declined a bit. A 3½ percent increase in steel prices, even if it had "stuck" (which is by no means sure), would have had little direct effect on either index, and fears of widespread repercussions on other prices, though freely expressed at the time of U.S. Steel's move, were almost certainly exaggerated beyond all reason. The truth of the matter is—and economists of the most varying views are in substantial agreement on this—that inflation and mass unemployment don't go together in an economy like that of the United States today. There may be some doubt about how much unemployment is needed to scotch the inflation danger, but most economists would probably accept the proposition that the American economy has enough and to spare today.

If this is true, the paradoxical conclusion follows that the danger of inflation would become serious again only if business or government or both should succeed in devising policies that would lead to a drastic reduction in unemployment. Everyone from Kennedy down of course proclaims undying devotion to this goal. Apart from periodic hikes in the arms budget, however, no one ever does anything about it. The reason, in the final analysis, is simple: what would be required to solve the problem of unemployment *and* the problem of inflation within the context of a peace economy would be nothing less than the comprehensive planning of the price and investment policies of the entire Big Business sector. Kennedy has no intention and even less desire to do anything of the sort. And if he did have, he would soon find that he had not the heads of a few companies to contend with but the entire capitalist class, united and aroused in defense of the sacred rights of private property and free enterprise.

(April 16, 1962)

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HOMAGE TO A SUBVERSIVE

BY JOHN BEECHER

For Henry David Thoreau 1817-1862

Soon, Henry David, wind will fill the land
saluting your centenary. Do you
suppose that alma mater's orators
at her memorial solemnities
will quote: "What branches of learning did you
find offered while at Harvard, Mr. Thoreau?"
"All of the branches and none of the roots."
And will Concord's divines in eulogies
of you dwell on the public scandal of
your unchurched life and unrepentant end?
"It's time to make your peace with God, Henry!"
"I'm not aware," the long-faced death-watch heard
you quip, "that God and I have ever quarreled."

The pietists who con your works by rote
forswear you and themselves with servile oaths
to placate golfing clerics, bawds of the press,
snoopers, war-hawks, kept Congressmen. Silent
they stand while lying leaders make our name
odious to men, shield tyrants with our might,
huckster new-packaged servitude for freedom,
and dub the peoples' butchers "democrats."
The coffle of pampered house-slaves will dare hymn
you dead. Come back! They'll turn you in. "How should
a man behave toward this government
today? I answer, that he cannot without
disgrace associate himself with it."

John Beecher is a poet who, with his wife Barbara, runs the Rampart Press in Phoenix, Arizona, where they hand-set and print beautiful books.

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MARXISM AND EXISTENTIALISM—I

BY ADAM SCHAFF

It can hardly be denied that the sudden "eruption" of existentialist influence has been one of the most curious phenomena in Polish intellectual life in the past few years. To account for the sudden and stormy success of a philosophical trend in a milieu in which it was not only completely unknown but also traditionally alien, it is certainly necessary to examine the situation above all in its socio-psychological context. Above all, but not exclusively. For the problem has its philosophical aspect *sensu stricto,* and the elucidation of this aspect should help us to understand the issue as a whole.

In the philosophical controversies which have been going on in Poland recently (not only in those which for the last few years have concentrated on the issue of the subject of philosophy, although here they have been marked by particular vehemence), two different concepts of philosophy have been formulated. Some claim that philosophy is a science concerned with the most general laws governing the whole of reality, while others tend to regard it as a specific branch of reflections on human life, in the sense of the proper conduct of the individual both with regard to himself and to others—and do not even claim for it the highly responsible name of science. This difference of opinion is not necessarily expressed directly in the form of statements on the essence and tasks of philosophy. It may—and this is most often the case—assume an indirect form and appear as an implication of the various partial and concrete issues which are raised by the advocates of the two different concepts of philosophy.

In introducing the two chief antagonists we have taken into account a line of division which is not only of the utmost importance for the contemporary world but has been sanctioned

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by a long tradition. For does it not date back to the Ionian school in the one case, and the Socratic school in the other? It is precisely in this sense that we can speak of the Ionian and Socratic lines in the history of philosophy.

That the antagonists of today should refer to those remote and respectable traditions is fully justified. In the tradition of the Ionian thinkers, although in their philosophical speculations they combined the spontaneous reflection of reality with religious myth, are rooted all those modern trends according to which philosophy's tasks are closely associated with the research of the different sciences and its specific domain is the study of the most general laws governing the world. And Socrates was the philosopher who, as Cicero put it, brought philosophy down from heaven to earth and introduced her into human dwellings.

In addition to the main division of philosophical systems into the materialist and the idealist, several others can be made, for example, into empiricism and rationalism, empiricism and irrationalism, the static and the dynamic vision of the world, etc. All these divisions are in one way or another mutually interconnected, but not necessarily in the sense of their being grouped along the main line of division of philosophical systems; on the contrary, they rather appear intertwined with each other. That is why the history of philosophy presents anything but a pedantic "black-and-white" scheme. Both materialism and idealism allow for various approaches to the subject of philosophy and, in particular, for more than one solution of the controversy between the Ionian and Socratic trends—all the more so since, as in other questions, this division has never been historically "pure." Only in extreme cases was the interest in moral issues rejected by the advocates of the broad, Ionian interpretation of philosophy's tasks; similarly, it was only in exceptional cases that supporters of the Socratic concept of philosophy actually dissociated themselves from ontological and epistemological problems. This is even borne out by the example of two trends as extreme as contemporary neopositivism and existentialism.

It is not at all difficult to account for this phenomenon: it confirms once more the familiar thesis that we cannot get rid of *actually existing* problems by means of a purely doctrinal

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negation of their existence. A classical illustration of this thesis is provided by neopositivism, with its doctrine of what are called pseudo-problems, which was supposed among other things to demonstrate that propositions dealing with a broadly conceived science of morals merely have the grammatical shape of sentences, but are devoid of meaning—in the specific sense of the word; in other words, that they are *meaningless*. What did the neopositivists mean when, together with many other problems, they classified those questions which are the specific feature of existentialism under the heading of poetical emotions and deprived them of any scientific character? Surely, no more than that questions concerning, for example, the meaning of life and death cannot be answered in the same way as questions about the temperature of a liquid, and the like. Certainly not. But does that imply that the problem disappears, or that it is not a philosophical problem?

Unfortunately it is not only neopositivism that has had a guilty conscience over this kind of problem. Similar sins have been committed by Marxism (although in a different way, for quite different reasons, and from different standpoints), and this has markedly affected the development of the ideological struggle in Poland.

As far as its doctrine is concerned, Marxism, unlike positivism, has no inhibitions against the study of the place and role of the individual—issues which have been monopolized by existentialism. On the contrary, the origins of Marxism are largely to be sought in this sphere of interests, although from the very beginning it formulated its questions in a way diametrically opposed to that of existentialism. Thus, for example, the whole early Marxian idea of *alienation* falls within this category, although Marx's approach was quite different from that of the existentialists. Thus Marxism is fully "equipped" to deal with these and similar problems; it needs no extension of its "vocabulary," much less any "supplementing" with existentialism. But such problems were neglected in the further development of Marxism; and because they were tackled by others (in most cases from completely false, idealist positions) they have come to be regarded as alien and hostile to Marxism.

Why did this happen? Why did Marxism at first neglect

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the study of these problems and then completely dissociate itself from it? Primarily because its close association with the revolutionary working-class movement had made it concentrate on the laws of social development, on the laws of transition to socialism and of socialist construction, on questions relating to the movements and struggles of the masses. As a result of this practical, political preoccupation of Marxism, matters connected with the individual human being and his specific problems were pushed into the background. And later, after the victory of the proletariat, when better objective conditions for this kind of study existed, another adverse factor began to intervene with ever greater force: other trends, alien and not infrequently plainly hostile to Marxism, took hold of these problems, monopolized them, and transformed them into a weapon in the struggle *against* the revolutionary working-class movement. The odium of this struggle became associated with the problems dealt with by the hostile trends, and in this way the problems themselves came to be regarded as something alien and hostile. This was certainly wrong and false, but the process is psychologically understandable. The result, as Sartre has correctly pointed out, has been a historical gap in Marxist philosophy.

The origins and persistence of existentialist influence in the 19th and 20th centuries can be explained—and this is by no means a primitive sociological approach—as the consequence of social factors. For the connection between these trends and the moral and political crises typical of periods of unrest, when one social order is giving place to another, is only too obvious. It is such periods that give birth to an interest in the laws of social development and promote research in this field, at the same time stimulating reflection on the individual and his experiences—reflections arising from the perturbations of the age and from the crises they bring about. For there are certain individual problems and experiences (such as the problems of death or of the meaning of life) which repeat themselves in all epochs; but in certain periods—when the general belief in the stability of social institutions is shaken, when a struggle is in progress and it is accompanied by a moral and political crisis, and when a choice must be made even though the traditionally established criteria

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of such a choice no longer appear valid—life itself pushes this sphere of problems into the foreground. This, among other things, accounts for the unprecedented mass appeal of existentialism after World War II. Not only the problems it raised but also (or perhaps primarily) its underlying *mood*—the mood of depression and resignation, the sense of hopelessness pervading the life of the individual in his struggle against all-powerful and irrational forces—was actually a *reflection* of what people frequently felt; it appealed to them all the more easily because its concerns were the same as their own thoughts and feelings.

The influence of all these factors had to be even stronger in our specific conditions of the years 1956-1957. This was something more than the general disbelief in established criteria, the general crisis of values, and the general feeling that human existence was precarious and conscious action meaningless—all of which normally accompanies the shocks of war and revolution and leads to profound moral crises. In Poland, at least in a certain milieu, other, perhaps even more violent, storms occurred. The exposure by the international Communist movement of what our jargon terms "the errors and distortions of the past period" was, for many, a moral and political earthquake causing individual moral crises, varying in kind and degree.

Is it at all surprising that as a result of what had been revealed, those who formerly had blindly obeyed all orders because they believed them to be right presently began to raise questions about man's responsibility for his actions, about the conflict between conscience and discipline, the place and role of the individual in the mass movements, the decisions that must be made in the event of a clash of different norms of conduct and the resulting moral conflicts? No, it is not at all surprising. On the contrary, it is something quite normal and understandable. I might even say: anyone who has not, in one way or another, come to grips with this situation, who has not restated his attitude to these questions (if he ever gave them any thought at all) is either completely primitive or suffers from the worst kind of moral insensitivity. Not only was it permissible to ask all these questions—they simply *had to be posed.*

If this is so, then is it at all surprising that in their search people turned towards a point from which they could reasonably

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hope for an analysis of these burning problems and for an answer to their impatient queries? Again, the answer must be no. That they should have turned to existentialism was not pleasant, it has brought bad effects, but it was fully justifiable, particularly if one takes into account the atmosphere of powerful moral shock and political confusion in which this search was taking place. The gap in the philosophical development of Marxism—a gap which was mentioned by Sartre and the existence of which cannot be denied—has proved both important and painful in its effects. If only because *les absents ont toujours tort.*

The preceding remarks are not designed to *justify* the revisionist tendencies which look to existentialism for inspiration. Any account of the success of existentialism in our own ranks must first of all consist of an examination of those of our own errors and shortcomings which have made this success possible. Thus, in the final analysis, such an account is a search for ways and means of changing this state of affairs, a search for the appropriate forms of *struggle*. This is all the more important because that form of existentialism which, in the version of Sartre, has become a kind of philosophical fashion since the last war, has been not only very attractive in its form but also much more accessible to the mass public in its content. This atheistic existentialism, combined as it was with the progressive social tendencies of its preachers, was a *novum* in the history of this multiform trend and was far more acceptable to those with leftist affiliations than any other trends which were clearly bourgeois in outlook. All this explains why it is existentialism that has become the "fashionable" philosophy of revisionism in Poland, and explains its sudden "eruption" and its rapid "career."

The only conclusion to be drawn from this is that we must take the stage as soon as possible to tackle the problems we have neglected, to give *our own* answer to the questions involved, to fill the gap that has arisen.

For all these reasons we must examine in some detail the following questions. Where does the appeal of the problems dealt with by existentialism lie? Which of these problems should be recognized as of *actual* importance? And which of them

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should be, accordingly, tackled from Marxist positions? It is not our aim to give an appreciation of existentialism as a doctrine, or to analyze all of its theses. Our task is much more modest, but all the more concrete: to examine those problems, concerned particularly with the theory of personality, which are common to existentialism and the issues which are socially important in Poland today.

(To be continued)

Nowhere in the whole body of Soviet Marxist theory is there the implication that the Soviet Union, for ideological or any other reasons, should itself initiate a war. This does not mean, of course, that there are ideological barriers to the Soviet Union's *ever* initiating a war, that it will not, under any conditions, utilize military force to promote its security, or that the Communists have especial devotion to peace as an ideal. Indeed, in former days, they talked of utilizing a war—started by somebody else—for furthering their goals. What is being said is only that there is no ideological compulsion to military aggression. Soviet doctrine foresees communism coming to the world through other means than military conquest.

—Fred Warner Neal, U.S. Foreign Policy and the Soviet Union

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THERE'S SOMETHING IN THE AIR

BY ALEXANDER L. CROSBY

In Vietnam the Communists have been winning converts, the newspapers report, because of American exuberance in spraying the country with DDT. It was not official policy to aid the reds in any manner whatsoever. What happened was that our overseas technicians decided to wipe out man-eating mosquitoes and crop-eating insects along with the Viet Cong. Tons and tons of DDT were rushed to Vietnam and unleashed on the rice paddies.

But you can never be sure how a war will turn out. This one backfired. The spraying virtually exterminated all the cats in our part of Vietnam, probably because they licked the poison from their fur, and it also killed most of the birds, probably because they ate the poisoned insects. The result was that rats and surviving insects took a new lease on life, thanks to the disappearance of their age-old enemies. Dividing the work between them, the rats attacked the stores of grain while the insects decimated the growing crops. People went hungry. "See what the Americans did!" the reds told the peasants. The peasants concluded that DDT means Democracy Deflates Tummies, and they joined up with the reds by thousands.

It could be argued, and I propose to do it, that our national hankering for poisons may decide the fate of the American Way of Life, which will hereinafter be referred to as AWOL. We are approaching the stage at which there will be a suitable poison for everything except pregnancy, unemployment, and stuttering. Consider just a few items in our agricultural arsenal as described in *The Garden Journal* of March-April, 1962, by Dr. P. P. Pirone, senior plant pathologist of the New York Botanical Garden:

Thuricide means death for horn worms, army worms, and

Alexander L. Crosby, pamphlet writer, has just written ***The Rape of the First Amendment*** for the Emergency Civil Liberties Committee.

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other leaf-feeding insects. It is loaded with microbes—more than 80,000,000,000 spores per ounce. The prescribed dose is 2,500,000,000,000 to 5,000,000,000,000 spores per acre.

Cellosize and Methocel are the innocent names of cellulose derivatives that make mites explode. These poisons should, of course, be kept away from any wanted child.

If you don't like snakes slithering through the outdoor drinking area, just spray the ground with Snake-Stop. It will keep the snakes at your neighbor's place for about a month. What would happen if your neighbor and everybody else sprayed his land is hard to imagine. Perhaps the snakes would be forced to stand on their tails at the boundary lines until they collapsed from starvation accentuated by general fatigue.

The man who wants to have the most beautiful lawn in the block regards crabgrass with feelings akin to those shown by many wealthy entrepreneurs toward the White House occupant of the late 1930's. Unlike those frustrated capitalists, he can work out his hate with a poison. Either Dacthal or Zytron will prevent the seeds of crabgrass, an annual, from germinating.

The risk and the opportunity in our passion for poisons is that the consequences are unpredictable. A few years ago the English, after losing billions of cabbages over the centuries to billions of rabbits, decided to dispense with rabbits altogether. So they imported a rabbit disease from the continent and soon there were no more rabbits. But there were many less chickens, too, for the starving foxes descended upon every poultry yard to fill the gap in their diet.

Who can foretell the future of suburbia if all crabgrass were exterminated? Mice are sustained by the abundant seeds. Cutting off this food supply could drive the mice indoors, where they might be followed by the more intrepid snakes and owls that depend on an abundance of mice. The ensuing emotional disturbances among tidy housewives would be considerable. If our laboratories could not quickly step up production of Snake-Stop and discover an effective Owl-Stop, family budgets would be ruined by daily trips to the psychoanalyst. Most of the money would be wasted, since relatively few analysts have any training in the management of rodents, reptiles, and predators, and the task of getting a woman adjusted to living with these

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creatures demands a talent not often found among even the ablest practitioners.

Just as snakes are repelled by certain odors, so are people. A Park Avenue matron will shrink and flee from the smell of cheap perfume or garlic, while her mate recoils from the dubious fragrance of a 5¢ cigar. Since the votes of the well-heeled have long blocked the aspirations of the working people, the prescription is obvious: Spray the polling places with an essence compounded from the offensive substances. The spray, which could be covertly marketed as Stop-Fatcat, would produce enough runs in the Silk Stocking districts to swing an election. If widely employed throughout the nation, it could revolutionize the AWOL.

Extremists might advocate harsher measures. If Cellosize and Methocel will blow up mites, why not try them on the mighty? Indeed, this experiment may have been attempted. William Saroyan once wrote a story about a man who exploded in a barroom, leaving no traces, and it is possible that his inspiration came from the chemical industry.

But it seems to me that it would be wrongful to douse the lettuce of the rich with Cellosize or Methocel. It would probably be illegal, too, since our far-seeing legislators have doubtlessly passed laws against causing a person to explode from something he ate, even though the guilty substance was just as harmless as the manufacturers like to say.

The chemists of the proletariat must also face the fact that the odds are against them. The law of politics as well as physics is that action causes reaction. A handful of election victories won with the aid of Stop-Fatcat or a half-dozen internal explosions along Park Avenue would rock the ruling class to its foundations. Counter-measures would be planned and executed. Since the rich own the biggest laboratories and the best brains, and since enough money can accomplish anything in our AWOL, the consequences can be foreseen. The scientists would be given these instructions:

Invent a new spray. It need not be poisonous, but it must work directly on the human mind. It must be particularly effective on the minds of teachers, legislators, editorial writers, columnists,

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newscasters, and writers of almost everything that Americans read or see in the movies and television.

The slightest contact with this spray must convince the affected person that the United States is a peace-loving nation, while the Russians talk about disarmament only for propaganda purposes; that the real hope for peace lies in making and testing more nuclear weapons; that Cuba is a grave threat to our security and it is therefore necessary for the Cuban people to eliminate Castro, even if they don't want to; that our system of free private enterprise has made the American worker the luckiest fellow in the world; that labor unions, which may have served a useful purpose in times past, are largely dominated by racketeers; that unemployment is not a crucial problem and unemployment benefits must be kept at a minimum; that we are making great progress in eliminating discrimination, and patience is the best policy for Negroes; that the road to everlasting bliss is lined with new cars, new refrigerators, new TV sets, new washing machines, new dish-washers, new cold creams, new bras, and new houses with intercommunication systems, chest-high ovens, three bathrooms, and no book shelves.

The scientists will answer, "Can do." And the fact is they did. You didn't really think those airplanes were spraying DDT for gypsy moths, did you?

It is not that the citizen as consumer is stupid but that the institutional arrangements today are such that he cannot make rational choices. He has been raised on the doctrine that his selfish interest is paramount. He is the object of billions of dollars worth of advertising and publicity. He has been told by two presidents that it is his patriotic duty to buy, buy almost anything, it doesn't matter, as an act of public welfare. It displays the poverty of our political imagination and institutional arrangements when the highest office in the land is used to dole out such irrational advice. What kind of advice is this to give to a nation needing public improvements in its every part? Arnold Toynbee was serious when he remarked recently that Madison Avenue is a worse threat to our civilization than communism.

—*W. H. Ferry, The Dilemmas of Abundance, 1961*

Greenbacks are always picked up, even if they drop in the mud.

—*Paul Lafargue*

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ASHES OF DISCONTENT: THE PAST AS PRESENT IN JAMAICA

BY RUTH GLASS

West Indians of all social groups, at home and abroad, always say: "We have no history." It is that lament which is a main theme of any West Indian self-analysis. Before going to the Caribbean, I had accepted it without much thought. But then I realized, very soon, that I had never before been in any place in which history is so overwhelmingly alive as it is in the Caribbean islands.

Their rigid insularity is not just a geographical fact. It is the direct consequence of their colonial past—a consequence so far hardly modified because in most of these places there has been as yet no decisive break with the past. Their common history—the bitter history of sugar and slavery—has also been the great divider. Indeed, far more important still than the divisions between the Caribbean territories are the divisions within them. Insular social groups coexist, separated from one another, in insular places. It was in that manner that their colonial societies came into being; sharp social cleavages were built into them. Social segmentation was essential to the old sugar economy. And there has been hardly any time or opportunity as yet to obliterate the divisions.

It is in Jamaica that the force of the historical conditioning of West Indian social segmentation is most clearly apparent. There is not a single feature of that society that is not stamped by the past. The grafts of newness—like the chain of luxury tourist resorts along the north coast—appear so incongruous in this setting that they only serve to underline the all-pervasive historical survival.

In Jamaica, points of time more than 200 or 100 years ago seem like yesterday. And it is there that the contemporary

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observer may remember the warning given in a dispatch by the governor of a West Indian colony in 1824. Writing about the unrest among the slaves, Governor D'Urban concluded—and *he was proved to be right:* "*The result of all this information* compared and combined . . . compels me to be convinced that the spirit of discontent is anything but extinct, it is alive as it were under its ashes." So one might sum up all the information on Jamaica today: the island is littered with the remnants of a fire that is liable to flare up again. Jamaica is still branded by the institution of slavery.

Before and after the abolition of slavery, there were three nations on the island: white, the plantocracy, many of whom were agents of absentee owners; brown, "the free people of color"; black, the African slaves or ex-slaves. White, brown, and black alike were strangers: none of these three groups was really at home in Jamaica; and none of them was a cohesive one. They had no mutual and no common allegiance. In a system whose *raison d'être* was quick profit sent abroad, economic interests were not sufficiently rooted to lead to a sense of interdependent, long-term social obligation. Colonial society did not produce either a local squirearchy or a reformist middle class. And even the Africans, despite their remarkable and often successful examples of united action, were subject to the fragmentation implicit in the system. It was their inevitable reaction to slavery which caused them—then as now—to assert their individuality. Independent enterprise, however small-scale—and especially the possession of a piece of land—was, and still is, to them a symbol of freedom, if not of freedom from want.

As time went on, white and brown became by and large socially synonymous. So nowadays, there are two nations in Jamaica, brown and black: the brown élites, descendants of the plantocracy and of the "free people of color," together with some European and American newcomers—business and professional men—living in secluded comfort or even in luxury; the black masses, the ex-slaves from Africa—unemployed, underemployed, casual labor—still existing, segregated, in bondage to an unrelenting poverty. Among the privileged brown nation there is some sprinkling of white and also of black: Africans have entered administration and politics, and have become

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prominent in these fields, though even now they hardly ever reach "visible" positions in banking or commerce. But the few black people among the brown and white on the top are exceptions—so much so that when a black man reaches the top, his blackness seems to have washed off.

Where Prosperity Has a Light Skin

In Jamaica, prosperity still has a light skin, however varied in shade; poverty—almost always—has a black one. There is, of course, no legal discrimination by shade of color. Even so, light and black are the two extremes of the social scale in fearful juxtaposition to one another; and there is still barely any chance of the emergence of stable intermediate groups whose presence might introduce some coherence into the social pattern.

The social structure remains rigidly divided although the economy is being diversified. But it is still an economy largely controlled by absentee owners: itinerant entrepreneurs are attracted by promises of tax holidays; invest in labor-intensive enterprises; import their own supervisory staff; and export their profits. It is the old colonial story with a new vocabulary. And it has familiar consequences—deepening, not blurring, the old schisms.

"Jamaican society is increasingly polarized." This is a constant motif in Jamaican conversations. But the diagnosis usually stops at that point: the habit of an economy based on absentee ownership is so deeply ingrained that it is taken for granted in its present neo-colonial form. All attention is given to the call for political independence—a call repeated for various reasons, by no means all liberating in intention, throughout Jamaican history. The essential complementary concept of economic independence has hardly as yet been thought of—not in Jamaica (though certainly in British Guiana).

Neo-colonial economic development, haphazard and precarious—predominant throughout the British West Indies—has the effect of making a vulnerable society even more vulnerable. It creates newness in small patches, without arresting decay—quite apart from its failure to catch up with the needs of a rapidly growing population. It provides scarce opportunities for social mobility. It benefits a few and ignores the many, who

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are well aware of this dichotomy. And so—superimposed upon the old cleavages, upon a historical sense of rootlessness, and upon the claustrophobia of insular existence—that kind of economic development contributes to a widespread attitude of *sauve qui peut*. The privileged groups withdraw into their own comfortable secluded domesticity. Those who belong to, or who might form, the middle strata take, whenever they can, their only chance of escape—migration overseas. The poor have no such chance: they are left behind. And in consequence, the contrast between prosperity at the top and impoverishment at the bottom of the social scale becomes unbearably tense.

Contrasts in Kingston

Nowhere can this contrast be seen more clearly than in Kingston, where almost a quarter of the island's population now live. During the past fifteen years urban Kingston has grown considerably faster than the total Jamaican population. It has been a dual growth, motivated by prosperity and by destitution, both in a sense parasitic, as both have occurred without a firm economic basis for urbanization. The top groups have climbed up to new suburbs strung along the ranges of the hills. Down below, the dreadful shack dumps of West Kingston have become darker, denser, larger—through the continuous influx of rural people, unable to subsist in the country, looking for a foothold at the fringes of the urban economy. Brand new gleaming roads and houses, furniture, refrigerators, large cars—that is the picture of Mona Heights and of similar suburbs to which a minority have retreated. In and around Kingston Pen, where the masses exist in a state of appalling unrelieved neglect, the sights, the smells, the sounds, even the forces of heat and rain, are those of a different world. Here there are flimsy miserable huts, thrown together, made of refuse—paper, cardboard, packing cases, bits of sticks, and parts of discarded motor-car bodies. Here there are open drains, no latrines, no sewage disposal. There is a constant water famine, barely one standpipe for hundreds of people; it is a maze of sodden dirt tracks through a jungle of habitations, unfit for living creatures of any kind.

There are similar shanty towns, squatters' colonies, ramshackle camps of urban hangers-on in other Caribbean ter-

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ritories, in other underdeveloped areas of the world, and in some regions of advanced countries too. But the Kingston jungles are exceptional both in extent and in the degree of abandonment they expose. There is nothing like them anywhere else in the West Indies, nor in countries whose average income per head is lower than that of Jamaica. The Kingston slums are in a category apart, not only because they exist in juxtaposition to affluence, but—more important—because they represent, unmistakably, the miserable chaos resulting from a system designed to produce human disintegration, and still capable of producing it.

It is when you go into the slum camps of Kingston (and few outsiders from the comfortable areas of Jamaica ever do)—it is then that you are directly confronted by colonial history: you are in the presence of the aftermath of slavery. You cannot forget "the giant evil" for one second; and you are not allowed to forget it. You meet people who, almost without exception, think of themselves as exiles, and who in their diverse ways construct from old memories some dream, some hope, some plan of liberation. Men and women stand around for hours—sullen, numbed. Children are unchildlike. There are many adult men here who at best can do no more than earn a shilling a day through odd jobs of carpentry or hawking. Depression is dominant. Even so, there are signs of determination and, undeniably, of defiance. People stop short in anger seeing a white face: the symbol of privilege, the mark of Cain.

The Ras Tafarians

In the shack city of Kingston live several different groups of Ras Tafarians: members of a cult, or rather of divergent cults, inspired by the passion of the slaves' protest against their masters. It is they who follow, directly, the tradition of the 18th- and 19th-century slave rebellions. They have given a new religious meaning to the old African home-sickness: they take their name from Ras Tafari—Haile Selassie; he is their "Living God," their Messiah; Ethiopia is their Zion; repatriation is their goal. Their Bible, the Old Testament, is peopled with black men: they have no doubt that the prophets and kings of Israel

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were Africans like themselves. To them "the ways of the white man are evil, especially for the black."

Some of the Ras Tafari groups lead a pious life, in shared poverty with small groups of their brethren. Their motto and greeting is "perfect love"—a love which will, so they trust, take them home to Africa. There are other Rastas, fanatic and militant, whose ideology is a blend of myth, religion, anarchistic politics, and black nationalism. They wear their beards long; they let their hair grow, piling it up, matted, in enormous bushy wildness. The very appearance of these "locksmen" is a proclamation of their protest: they have turned degradation into an honor; they want to be outcasts from a society they despise, and of whose guilt they speak in endless soliloquies. All their devotion is directed towards Africa, and most of all to Ethiopia. For Jamaica they have nothing but resentment and contempt. So these militant Rastas have gone to the most inaccessible part of the West Kingston jungle, across a gully, to an insular fortification of their own.

While I was there with the Rastas, they made it quite clear to me that it was not just an outsider's fanciful recollections of snatches from history books which made the past so alarmingly alive in the desolate encampments of West Kingston. The Rastas remember all that history much better: it is the premise of their emotions and their thought. Indeed, some of the brethren who believe in reincarnation, "affirm that they personally and physically experienced the whips of the slave drivers." They put me through a catechism: "Do *you* know how long Britain has owned Jamaica? How we were brought here? How long we were slaves? Who is responsible for our condition?" "Look at these children. It's because of *you* that they are in rags." A young locksman came up, looking with astonishment at the white intruder. "Are *you* a human being?"

The influence of the Rastas is spreading. And however varied their beliefs and orientations, there is one idea which all the groups in the shack city of West Kingston have in common: they all regard themselves as Africans. Indeed, throughout the West Indies, the term Negro is virtually unheard. The masters had intended to deprive the slaves of the remembrance of their origin. ". . . The very name of the African must cease to exist

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in their memories." But that was one deprivation which the slave owners were unable to inflict.

So one section of Jamaican society looks more fixedly than before to Africa as the homeland; others continue to regard Britain as the mother country. The "free people of color" have always given their loyalty wholeheartedly to the British flag. Since the days of the abolition controversy, the Africans, however homesick, have regarded the British government as their protector against their colonial masters. And there are other directions towards which Jamaicans look: there are also those who dream of an association with the wealth of the United States. How can a small insular society, so divided in its conditions and aspirations, buffeted by conflicting influences, how can such a society reach the social cohesion necessary for achieving nationhood?

But I did not return only with unanswered questions. I had certainly learned what West Indians mean when they say: "We have no history." They say so because they have as yet no history which they have jointly made themselves. Nor can they even now, in the nature of their case, make history freely on their own. The existence of the Caribbean colonies was based upon the denial of the obligation of common humanity. Therefore, they cannot advance without upheaval unless that obligation is affirmed—unequivocally, concretely, emphatically—by the descendants of those who denied it.

Indeed, the West Indian peoples cannot make an entirely new start so long as they have had no historical catharsis. They have never had it. Nor has there ever been an Eichmann trial of the slave traders, the slave owners, the masters of indentured labor (who were secure in their position until 1917, when the system of indenture was at last outlawed). After abolition, the slave owners were compensated for the loss of their human property; the slaves were not compensated for the carnage, the torture, for the expatriation from human society which many millions of them had suffered. All that history, so lucrative for Britain, so disastrous to Africa and the West Indies, has been conveniently filed away. But it is still there: nowhere in the Caribbean can its lasting penetrating pressure be ignored. In these islands the recognition of the past as present is inescapable;

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and so is the recognition of the white man's colonial guilt—a guilt which the individual feels, many generations later, because he is a member of a privileged group. A journey to the Caribbean gives a new compelling meaning to the concept of historical responsibility. There is a huge debt outstanding.

The function of the historian is neither to love the past nor to emancipate himself from the past, but to master and understand it as the key to the understanding of the present.

—E. H. Carr, What Is History?

When eras are on the decline, all tendencies are subjective; but on the other hand when matters are ripening for a new epoch, all tendencies are objective.

—Goethe

It is perhaps worth taking a harder look at the path we are traveling, at the end to which this militarily determined policy, this militarily created rigidity of public attitude, inevitably condemns us. That end is war. For if there can be no flexibility, if the very idea of co-existence and disarmament is a fantasy not even to be considered, if the very existence of a Red China certain before long to enter the nuclear age cannot be recognized, then there is left only one solution—the inconceivable violence which long-maintained tensions inevitably must trigger.

—Fred J. Cook, "The Juggernaut," The Nation, October 28, 1961

The strength of the Constitution lies entirely in the determination of each citizen to defend it. Only if every single citizen feels duty bound to do his share in this defense are the constitutional rights secure. Thus, a duty is imposed on everyone which no one must evade, notwithstanding the risks and dangers for him and his family.

—Dr. Albert Einstein, 1954

This country was not built by men who were afraid and it cannot be preserved by such men. Our Constitution, in unequivocal terms, gives the right to each of us to say what we think without fear of the power of government. . . . I believe that true Americanism is to be protected not by committees that persecute unorthodox minorities, but by strict adherence to basic principles of freedom that are responsible for this nation's greatness.

—U.S. Supreme Court Justice Hugo L. Black

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A FEW THOUGHTS ON THE GREAT DEBATE

BY PAUL A. BARAN

Recently, the Italian left-wing magazine *Nuovi Argomenti*, edited by Alberto Moravia and Alberto Carocci, organized, in conjunction with the publishing house of Einaudi, an international symposium on the 22nd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The two articles which follow, one by Paul Baran and the other by Paul M. Sweezy, were written as contributions to this symposium.—The Editors

In briefest terms, the central issue brought to the fore by the 22nd Congress and the new Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union seems to me to be the following: Does the formal and irreversible break with, and the uncompromising condemnation of, the entire complex of repression, violence, and dogmatism which constituted a prominent feature of Stalin's domination in the socialist part of the world call also for an equally decisive change in the strategy of socialist construction adopted under his leadership?

Although, to my knowledge, *all* socialists—on the right wing and on the left wing of the movement, in the Soviet Union and in Italy, in China, and in France—recognize the necessity and desirability of the break, there are several countries where there is no such consensus regarding the advisability of a change in the strategy of socialist construction. The right, or as it is now called "revisionist," wing uses the universal revulsion against the misdeeds of Stalin to demand a more or less radical abandonment of *basic policies* associated with his name. Apart from whatever specific arguments against these policies they may advance, their case rests heavily on the contention that all the abuses and excesses of Stalin's rule represent an inevitable outgrowth of the basic policies for which it stood. The left, or "orthodox" group, on the other side, in-

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Professor Baran is the author of *The Political Economy of Growth* which MR Press will reprint shortly with a long new foreword.

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sists on preserving more or less intact these basic policies, even at the cost of soft-pedalling the drive against the "cult of the personality." Its argument is essentially that Stalin's "general line" was on the whole correct, that such crimes and excesses as were committed represented not an integral part but a more or less fortuitous and therefore avoidable accompaniment of what was otherwise a wise course. In warning against "throwing out the baby with the bathwater," this current of opinion is able to adduce as powerful supporting evidence the undeniable fact that in China where a left-wing, Stalinist course has been followed, Stalinist terrorism and aberrations are conspicuously absent.

This is obviously anything but a purely doctrinal dispute; what it reflects are rather two fundamental and closely interrelated problems confronting the world's socialist camp. First, it must be clearly recognized that the different countries constituting the socialist part of the world find themselves at the present time in radically different stages of economic development. At one end of the spectrum stand the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, and also Poland and Hungary where levels of industrialization and productivity have been attained (or, in part, have been inherited) which make it possible to shift gears and to move forward along the road of balanced economic progress. In these countries there is—occasional bottlenecks and temporary shortages of various kinds notwithstanding—no need for a stern policy of austerity, no longer any necessity for severe curtailment of the production of consumer goods, housing, and the like. Settling down to high but not breakneck rates of investment and expansion of output, these countries are able not only to afford the abandonment of the policy of "forced marches" that was characteristic of the Stalin era; they *must* greatly liberalize the economic and social conditions prevailing in their societies if further economic, cultural, and political advancement is to be assured. For here, as elsewhere, there is a powerful dialectic at work: the very system of extreme pressure on consumption, of unquestioned subordination to authority, and of rigidly dogmatic concentration on principal targets, which was imposed by

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Stalin and which enabled the Soviet Union to get over the "hump" of initial industrialization—this very system has turned, in the current phase of history, into a prohibitive obstacle to further economic and social growth. This was visible on every side. The utmost centralization in the administration of industry—to take one example—was not only possible as long as the size of the industrial sector was small, but was altogether indispensable in a period of relative industrial inexperience, shortage of qualified managerial personnel, and minimal choice in the rational utilization of industrial output. The same degree of centralization in the organizational structure of a vast industrial economy, disposing over able and skilled administrators at all levels and with a relatively wide choice in the utilization of output, leads to time-consuming and energy-wasting bureaucratic procedures, undermines the initiative of industrial managers and their responsiveness to new methods of production and to changing demands on the part of consumers—in a word, causes an irrational allocation of resources. Similarly, severe limitation of consumption, of construction of housing and other facilities, while inevitable at a time when the principal task is "primary accumulation," reduces incentives to work and to strive for higher qualifications, and not only imposes avoidable sacrifices and suffering on working people but becomes an impediment to efficient production. And finally, in a different area, if iron-fisted insistence on discipline and on the assignment of absolute priority to the immediate tasks of economic development in all intellectual, artistic, and cultural activity may have been conducive at a certain stage to the generation of an unwavering single-mindedness of purpose among broad popular masses, the continuation of such unbending dogmatism at the present time perpetuates a narrow-minded incapacity to comprehend new historical developments and becomes a formidable fetter on creativity and freedom in all areas of national life.

All this is indisputable, and as far as the Soviet Union and other similarly situated socialist countries are concerned, there is no room for disagreement with the view that—to paraphrase a line from Schiller—"Stalin has done his duty and Stalin

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must go." That he did much more (or rather much less) than his duty—that he permitted himself and others to usurp vast powers and to abuse them for purposes of self-aggrandizement, nepotism, and arbitrariness, for the sake of vengeance and persecution directed against personal enemies—made it imperative that his departure assume the dimensions of a major political upheaval. Stalin's henchmen and satraps had to be uprooted everywhere, the methods of government which had become established under his direction had to be thoroughly revamped, the entire prevailing atmosphere had to be drastically changed if the vitally necessary and unpostponable liberalization and rejuvenation were to be accomplished.

But one man's meat is another man's poison, and what constitutes a necessary and positive development in the Soviet Union's advance to a socialist democracy is wholly premature for China which still has a long way to go until it reaches the Soviet Union's level of industrialization and per capita output. Indeed, China is still in the throes of the most difficult initial phase of economic development, and the problems which it faces are in many respects even more complex than those which confronted the Soviet Union during the first two Five Year Plans. Under such conditions, aggravated as they have been by a series of natural disasters in agriculture and possibly by certain errors committed by the leadership, liquidation of austerity, relaxation of pressure on consumption, and a measure of "demobilization" of national effort are certainly not on the immediate agenda. Having reached at best only the first encampment on the long and arduous ascent to a richer society, the Chinese "people throughout the country must determine to work hard for several more years to fulfill this glorious task in the spirit of uninterrupted revolution."[1]

And having systematically inspired the people of China by invoking the glowing example of Soviet successes, linked inseparably for 25 years with the stewardship of Stalin, having explained their strategy of development to the Chinese masses

1 *National Programme for Agricultural Development 1956-1967*, Peking, 1960, p. 57.

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largely in terms evolved in the Soviet Union under the influence of Stalin, the Chinese leadership feels at the present time less than ever inclined to demolish wholesale an ideological structure that has come to play a crucial role in China's as yet "uninterrupted revolution." For not only would such a wrecking operation tend to undermine popular confidence in the leadership itself; it would hardly meet with much understanding and approval among the rank and file of the party and the broad popular masses who themselves were never subjected to Stalin's reign of terror. Thus to the Chinese, "de-Stalinization" is anything but an urgent issue. Little as they actually ever cared for Stalin himself—and for that dislike they have weighty historical reasons—as far as they are concerned, the condemnation of Stalin's *basic policies* and the destruction of his commanding prestige could hardly come at a less propitious time.

To be sure, abstractly speaking, there might have been a possibility of significantly changing the general situation and of rendering the more underdeveloped parts of the socialist world more amenable to a broadly gauged program of de-Stalinization and liberalization. This might have been more nearly feasible if the advanced socialist countries, in the first place obviously the Soviet Union, had been able and willing to alleviate markedly the difficulties experienced at the present time in China by furnishing *massive* economic assistance. Needless to say, to make a major impact on the economic situation of a country as vast and as populous as China, such aid would have to assume truly gigantic proportions. And it is equally obvious that rendering economic aid on such a scale would soon exceed the capabilities of the Soviet Union and of the better-off socialist countries in Europe. Further, an attempt to squeeze as much aid as possible out of the economies of the advanced socialist countries would not merely preclude all the liberalization and belt-loosening which have been undertaken but also jeopardize the political stability of these countries themselves, as was clearly shown in the "Kronstadts" of Berlin, Budapest, and Poznán.

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In any case, this course of denying or slowing down the long awaited improvement of the wretched living conditions which the Soviet, the German, and Polish peoples have had to endure now for many years, was flatly rejected by their present leadership. The relevant passages of the new Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union leave little doubt about the nature of this decision. Although stressing the commitment of the CPSU to international socialist solidarity and proffering brotherly help to other socialist countries, the document states that

the CPSU and the Communist Parties of the other socialist countries consider their tasks to be: In the economic field, expansion of trade between the socialist countries, development of the socialist international division of labor, increasing coordination of long-range economic plans among the socialist countries envisaging a maximum saving of social labor and an accelerated development of the world socialist economy and the promotion of scientific and technical cooperation.[2]

Khrushchev was even more explicit in his Report to the 22nd Congress where he observed that "by a common effort of fraternal parties were found and are being perfected new forms of inter-state relations—relations of economic, political and cultural cooperation based on principles of equality, *mutual advantage,* and brotherly *mutual* help."[3]

2 *Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Draft)*, Part II, section 6, paragraph 14. It is characteristic of the generally noticeable compromise nature of the Program that this clear statement is followed (in paragraph 16 of the same section) by the rather vague promise that "the CPSU and the Soviet people will do everything in their power to support all the peoples of the Socialist community in their construction of socialism and Communism."

3 *Pravda,* October 18, 1961. (Italics added.) This position was apparently spelled out and strongly stressed in an article in *Mezhdunarodnava Zhisn* (March, 1962) which is reported to have declared that unilateral sacrifices on the part of the Soviet people are entirely out of order. Cf. *New York Times,* March 26, 1962. See also "Answers to Readers' Inquiries" concerning the functions of the Committee for Mutual Economic Aid ("Comecon")" published in the theoretical organ of the Central Committee of the CPSU, *Kommunist* (No. 3, February 1961), where the "trade versus aid" principle is strongly emphasized. Of great interest are also the remarks of F. Konstantinov, Editor-in-Chief of that journal, concerning the, admittedly quite separate, case of the Albanian leadership which is accused by the Russians as well as

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But deeds and concrete blueprints are more eloquent than words and ringing declarations. And while it goes without saying that it is completely impossible to *equalize* per capita incomes in socialist countries in so widely divergent stages of economic development—particularly when the populations of the low income countries so vastly outnumber those of the relatively advanced ones—it is easy to understand that the majestic edifice of a society of plenty projected at the 22nd Congress has produced mixed reactions in the Chinese and some other Communist parties struggling desperately to overcome abysmal poverty in their countries. Reassured and strengthened as they may feel by the tremendous successes of the Soviet Union, and proud as they may be of the magnificent vistas opened up by the new Program, they can hardly fail to experience the strong sense of estrangement which "have nots" usually develop towards the "haves." Considering that the Program envisages an increase of Soviet national product by 500 percent in 20 years, that real per capita income is expected to grow in the same period by 350 percent, and that at the end of this time span the Soviet people are to enjoy the *highest* standard of living in the world, the shortest work week, and the most comprehensive social welfare arrangements, the question naturally arises whether *such* a momentous expansion of consumption and welfare is wholly compatible with socialist solidarity and fraternal mutual help. With the gap between Soviet output and that of other socialist countries as large as it is, wouldn't there be something to be said for the Soviet Union's seeking to "reach and overtake" the American per capita income, say, in 30 years rather than in the 20 years prescribed in the Program, and for its gaining in this way the possibility of providing more generous support to other members of the socialist camp? Further, wouldn't significant Soviet aid to the underdeveloped socialist countries in Asia, greatly accelerating and facilitating their socialist construction, enhance the prestige of socialism in the rest of the underdeveloped world even more than glittering prosperity in

by other socialist countries of seeking to perpetuate itself in spite of its inefficiency and inadequacies by becoming a permanent "pensioner" of the socialist camp. *Kommunist,* No. 17, November, 1961.

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the Soviet Union alone?

These are terribly difficult questions the answers to which are of necessity matters of judgment which can only be properly arrived at by taking into account the specific conditions prevailing in the individual countries as well as the overall strategy of the world's socialist movement. And wherever such is the case, there is ample room for differences of opinion and for more or less violent controversy. What renders the situation particularly complex, moreover, is that the elbow room available to the present Soviet leadership is much narrower than it would be to a regime of Stalin's type. With the liberalization and democratization of national life already having made considerable progress, it becomes increasingly hard for those who preside over the country and the Party today to make decisions which are likely to be unpopular, to allocate resources to purposes which, however worthy in themselves, are remote from the daily needs and aspirations of the Soviet "man in the street" who longs to have at last decent housing, decent food, and decent clothing.

This economic tension rending the world's socialist camp has its counterpart in a no less serious political strain, which constitutes the *second* question that has to be considered. For the circumstances of the individual socialist countries are not only most uneven in economic terms; they are no less so in the political realm, and in particular in the now all-important area of international relations. At the present time, the chief concern of the Soviet Union and of a number of European socialist countries—politically stable and embarked on long-range programs of economic and social advancement—is the alleviation of the threat of war, and, if possible, some reduction of the burden of armaments, both crucial to the realization of their ambitious goals. Just as in 1924, after the failure of the Hamburg uprising, a "right-wing" Soviet leadership took the view that the capitalist world had entered a period of "relative stabilization," and oriented its foreign policy under Litvinov towards relaxation of international tensions and collective security, so it is now held—for different reasons—that the current period demands "peaceful coexistence," and some accommodation with the imperialist powers. Then the reorientation took

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place because it was clear that the revolutionary storm following World War I had drawn to its close; now it is considered to be imperative because of the catastrophical consequences of a possible war, and because only under conditions of peace can the respite be won that is necessary to render the world's socialist camp wholly invincible and thus to win decisively the historic struggle for socialism on a global scale.

Thus what is involved here are the foremost problems of international revolutionary strategy. Which issues constitute the "program minimum" of today, the issues that *must* be settled before an accommodation with the Western powers can be accepted? Is it sufficient to arrive at some *modus vivendi* which would guarantee, say, an undisturbed development of the German Democratic Republic, as sometimes appears to be the Soviet view, or should a comprehensive settlement of the much more complex problems in Asia be considered to be a *conditio sine qua non* of any *détente?* And this in turn raises the question how to assess the power and the capacity to fight of the imperialist bloc. Is imperialism now, in the age of atomic equilibrium and universal uprising of colonial and dependent peoples, merely a "paper tiger" which would collapse if put on trial, or is there still enough life and vigor in the beast to destroy the world if cornered and driven to desperation?

It is easy to see that the answers of Asian Communists to these questions must tend to be quite different from those of the Soviet Communist Party. China and several other Asian countries are still in the grip of civil war. Nearly everywhere guerrilla fighters are waging heroic battles against reactionary, hateful dictatorships imposed and maintained in power by the military might of the United States. Frustrated in their most elementary aspirations, as in the case of China and Taiwan, or split in the middle like Korea, Vietnam, and Laos; denied their indisputable rights in international political bodies; subjected to economic discrimination and boycott, the socialist countries of Asia obviously regard the return of Taiwan to the homeland, the liberation of South Korea and South Vietnam, their admission to the United Nations, and so forth, as being no less urgent than the settlement of the conflict over Berlin.

This does not mean, as is frequently asserted in Western

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newspapers—maliciously, ignorantly, or both—that China wants to go to war over those issues or even is advocating that the foreign policy of the socialist camp should be one of taking reckless risks. Nothing could be further from the truth. What it does mean, however, is that the Chinese consider a more intransigent attitude towards the West to be imperative, believe that the "Spirit of Camp David" and most of what goes with it harms the morale of revolutionaries in Asia and elsewhere, and insist that at the present historical juncture a hard, uncompromising stand against imperialism would greatly contribute to the awakening and radicalization of the masses in the underdeveloped countries and thus to the strengthening of their socialist movements. The Soviet Union's taking at the same time the opposite tack, attempting to attain at least a measure of relaxation in the international atmosphere and to find some compromises on various, if only secondary issues, gives rise to the dark suspicion that the present Soviet leadership may be willing to come to terms with the United States if not at the expense, then at least without due regard to the interests, of China and the other socialist countries of Asia. It may be noted in passing that, ironically enough, there was more *concrete* evidence to support this suspicion in the case of Stalin than in the case of Khrushchev. It was the former and not the latter who was prepared to make a deal with President Roosevelt's emissary—Harry Hopkins—and to discourage the Chinese Communists' seizure of power in exchange for admittedly desperately needed American help to the Soviet Union. That nothing came of that deal is certainly more the "fault" of the Chinese and of the United States than of Stalin.

What this raises is the far-reaching question whether the *short-run* interests of the Soviet people are not now coming into a *genuine* contradiction not only with those of the underprivileged socialist countries but also with those of other backward nations striving for independence and socialism. For, wanting above all to prevent war and determined to attain its goals of socialist construction, the Soviet leadership is certainly continuously exposed to the danger of a "nationalist aberration." It may, indeed, come to feel less than enthusiastic about "premature" revolutionary upheavals in various parts of the world,

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not only in view of the danger of a military conflagration which they may entail, but also because, if successful, they may place the Soviet Union before the terrible dilemma of either providing large-scale economic aid, or losing face in the underdeveloped world and in the international socialist movement. We are confronted here with a problem which is not altogether new. It may have been wholly appropriate for the Soviet leadership in the days of Stalin to put brakes on revolutionary movements on a number of historical occasions—when the Soviet Union was not in a position to weather the possible military consequences of a socialist revolution in another country, and when it was unable to give such a revolution the necessary economic support. But would such a policy of braking and "going slow" be equally justified if adopted *now* when the military and economic might of the Soviet Union is incomparably larger?

As usual, one thing leads to another. Major problems, if unsolved, produce minor irritations, and the latter frequently overshadow the former. The number of such frictions and irritations in Sino-Soviet relations is apparently at the present time legion; their significance ranges from the withdrawal of Soviet technicians from China so as to stop their indoctrination with the Chinese appraisal of Soviet policies and Soviet leadership, to such symbolic acts as Chou en-Lai's early departure from the 22nd Congress or the Chinese press's giving only limited space and attention to the proceedings of the Congress and to the new Program which it adopted. There can be little doubt that these relatively minor, derivative conflicts could be ironed out without too much trouble—say, in a summit conference between Khrushchev and Mao Tse-tung—provided that the truly serious differences which lie behind them could be amicably composed. But it is by no means certain that this is possible *in the short run*. In practice, they may only be alleviated by a change in the objective conditions: when the progressive development of China and other socialist countries of Asia will have greatly narrowed the economic gap between them and the Soviet Union; when the international balance of power will have so changed as to improve greatly the international position of the Asian socialist countries; and when the

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threat of war recedes because of the rapidly growing military might of the socialist camp and the increasing resistance to military adventures in the Western world.

Meanwhile, if the considerations advanced above come anywhere near to encompassing the essence of the Great Debate, they suggest that it is by no means impossible that in the present phase of the world's revolutionary movement, the center of moral gravity and the seat of political leadership may move from Moscow to Peking, all the military strength and economic achievements of the Soviet Union notwithstanding. This need not preclude by any means the individual socialist countries' forward movement toward socialism, nor does it render it impossible that reconciliation and harmony among them will be achieved in the fullness of time. But to try to speculate on all the manifold short-run and long-run ramifications of such a momentous development would transcend by far the limits of this short note.

THE 22ND CONGRESS AND INTERNATIONAL SOCIALISM

BY PAUL M. SWEEZY

In what follows, I propose to comment briefly on topics suggested by the first two of the eight questions submitted by the editors of *Nuovi Argomenti* as a basis for this symposium. The first question deals with the contents, implications, and significance of the new Program adopted by the 22nd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPUSSR). The second question deals with what in the United States has come to be frequently referred to, not inappropriately, as de-Stalinization. It should be unnecessary to add that I make no pretense

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at *answering* the questions; I am merely expressing certain thoughts to which the questions have given rise.

Most of the comments I have seen on the new program adopted by the 22nd Congress of the CPUSSR deal with its second part which is concerned with the perspective and plans for the development of the Soviet Union itself. And yet the first part, entitled "The Transition from Capitalism to Communism Is the Road of Human Progress," also contains much interesting material which deserves analysis. Here I shall confine attention to two passages which seem to me to have an extraordinary interest from the theoretical point of view.

The first of these outlines what the working class of the capitalist countries can hope to achieve "even before capitalism is overthrown" and reads as follows:

> In the new historical situation, the working class of many countries can, even before capitalism is overthrown, compel the bourgeoisie to carry out measures that transcend ordinary reforms and are of vital importance to the working class and the progress of its struggle for socialism, as well as to the majority of the nation. By uniting large sections of the working people, the working class can make ruling circles cease preparations for a new world war, renounce the idea of starting local wars, and use the economy for peaceful purposes; it can beat back the offensive of Fascist reaction and bring about the implementation of a national program for peace, independence, democratic rights, and a certain improvement of the living standard of the people.

If I interpret this correctly, it amounts to a claim that the working class can force a change in the nature of capitalism without overthrowing the system. For surely it is part of the nature of capitalism to prepare for a new world war to destroy socialism, to entertain continuously the idea of starting local counter-revolutionary wars, and hence to use the economy not for peaceful but for warlike purposes. How is the working class to force the capitalists to give up these objectives and activities? It is hard to believe that the CPUSSR means to suggest that this can be done by winning parliamentary majorities and passing legislation: after all, the essence of the Leninist theory of the state is that as long as the instruments of coercion are in the hands of the bourgeoisie, parliamentary majorities not only

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can but will be thwarted whenever they challenge the basic interests of the bourgeoisie. And yet it is equally hard to see what other meaning can be attributed to the statement. Extra-parliamentary strikes and demonstrations cannot force fundamentally new policies: they will invariably be met by armed force if they are intended to enforce demands which contradict the requirements of the system. If the implication is that the working class can "in the new historical situation" somehow get control over the instruments of coercion and in this way enforce its will, then what is at stake is not merely "measures that transcend ordinary reforms" but a revolution which would either be abortive or quickly move on to break the economic power of the bourgeoisie—in other words, to overthrow the system.

Taken at its face value, in other words, the statement quoted seems clearly to contradict the traditional Leninist theory of the state. If this is intentional, then the leaders of the CPUSSR ought to tell us precisely what new historical experiences have led them to abandon so fundamental a theoretical doctrine, as well as what theory of the state they now espouse. If it is not intentional, then a specific disavowal of the claim quoted above would be in order. This is, I believe, a very important matter. Confusion about what can and what cannot be accomplished under capitalism can lead to all sorts of illusions and errors. If, for example, as the statement seems to suggest, disarmament really can be attained under capitalism, then all sorts of other things are also possible and socialists should shape their policies accordingly. If, on the other hand, disarmament cannot be forced on capitalist states (and I myself do not believe that it can), then it is necessary to draw altogether different conclusions.

The second passage to which I want to direct attention is as follows:

> The working class, supported by the majority of the people and firmly repelling opportunist elements incapable of renouncing the policy of compromise with the capitalists and landlords, can defeat the reactionary, anti-popular forces, win a solid majority in parliament, transform it from a tool serving the class interests of the bourgeoisie into an instrument serving the working people, launch a broad mass struggle outside parliament, smash the re-

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sistance of the reactionary forces and provide the necessary conditions for a peaceful socialist revolution. This can be done only by extending and continuously developing the class struggle of the workers and peasants and the middle strata of the urban population against big monopoly capital and reaction, and for far-reaching social reforms, for peace and socialism.

Apart from the language used, it is hard to see what differentiates this doctrine from the traditional Social Democratic theory of the possibility of achieving socialism through the methods of bourgeois legality. And it is, of course, subject to the same objections and criticisms. The major questions which it leaves unanswered are essentially the ones raised above: what about the armed forces? Will the bourgeoisie, defeated in parliamentary elections, hand over control of the armed forces to the workers? And even if it were willing to do so, would not the police, the army, the navy, the airforce—all selected, trained, and educated by the bourgeoisie—turn on their new masters? The time-honored Marxist answers to these questions are well known: the proletariat cannot take over the ready-made state machine, and in particular the existing instruments of coercion, and use them for its own purposes; it must smash the old state machine and create a new one loyal to proletarian aims.

If the CPUSSR believes that this theory no longer necessarily holds true, are we not entitled to ask for the concrete evidence that has caused this doctrinal shift? I for one must confess that I do not know of any such evidence. On the contrary, it seems to me that recent decades have been particularly rich in historical experiences which *confirm* the traditional Marxist theory. I would call attention particularly to the political history of Latin America in the period since World War II. Latin America has become a veritable laboratory in which all sorts of political theories are constantly put to the test. I think there can be no doubt that the Marxian theory alone has passed these tests and emerged stronger than ever.

With regard to the significance of "de-Stalinization" for the international socialist movement at this historical juncture, I agree wholeheartedly with the analysis contained in Professor Baran's contribution to this symposium, which he has been kind enough to let me see in manuscript. Stalinism has two mean-

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ings: on the one hand, the system of extreme centralization, tight discipline, and economic "forced marches"; on the other hand, the glorification of the leader, the abuses of power, blind intellectual dogmatism, etc. For the Soviet Union itself, the former aspect is no longer necessary and in fact has become an obstacle to progress; while the latter aspect is deeply abhorrent to a citizenry an increasingly large part of which has been educated in the scientific and humanist traditions of Marxism. De-Stalinization is therefore an absolute imperative for the Soviet leadership, and it is difficult to see how it could be effectively accomplished except by means of publicly conducted campaigns to destroy the symbols and remnants of the Stalinist system. For the less developed socialist countries, on the other hand, and in particular for China, Stalinism considered as a set of policies calling for centralization, discipline, and forced marches, is as necessary as ever, while its abhorrent features, having been largely absent in China and for obvious reasons never having been publicized there, hardly need to be taken into account. Under these conditions, the de-Stalinization campaigns can only be considered to be wholly negative and undesirable by the Chinese leadership. Professor Baran has discussed this problem in masterly fashion, and I have nothing to add except to note that we have here an example of a genuine contradiction in the world socialist system, one which has been caused by the uneven development of socialism on an international scale and which is therefore inevitable in exactly the same sense that the replacement of capitalism by socialism is inevitable. It is important that Marxists should understand this.

Having said this, I would like to add a comment on the significance of de-Stalinization for socialists *in the advanced capitalist countries,* a subject which Professor Baran does not touch upon.

Marx and Engels—and Lenin until near the end of his life—took it for granted that socialism would be achieved first in the most advanced capitalist countries; that the newly dominant working class would include the great majority of the people, who would be disciplined by their experiences in the class struggle and united by their common interests; and that under these circumstances the repressive organs of the state

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would be directed solely against counter-revolutionary elements of the old ruling class. For the people, socialism would mean freedom and democracy from the very outset; only for the tiny minority of exploiters would it mean dictatorship. This theory was undoubtedly oversimplified, failing as it did to take into account the complexity of the class structure of developed capitalism or the difficulty of weaning people, even working people, away from long-established ideologies and loyalties. Less democracy and more repression than the theory contemplated would doubtless have accompanied the beginnings of socialism even in Britain. But so great are the possibilities of rapid economic and cultural progress, through planning and the elimination of waste, in an already industrialized society that the authoritarian phase of the socialist revolution could have been of relatively brief duration, soon to be followed by an unprecedented flowering of democracy. The practices of the authoritarian phase would have been justified as emergency measures, just as bourgeois democracies justify similar practices in wartime; they need never have been institutionalized, and hence no apologetic ideology need ever have been developed.

Historically, of course, socialism did not come into the world in this relatively painless fashion. It first appeared in Russia, for the most part an extremely backward country, already ruined economically by an exhausting war and under attack by powerful external enemies. Under *these* conditions, it was inevitable that the authoritarian phase should last a long time, that its methods and practices should become thoroughly institutionalized, and that an elaborate apologetic ideology should be developed. It is, of course, precisely these phenomena that constitute the essence of Stalinism. Doctrinally, Stalinism represented a sharp deviation from, and revision of, traditional Marxism.

Now the point which I would like to stress is this: With the revolution victorious only in Russia, and with the rest of the world once again (relatively) pacified and stabilized under imperialist rule, the fledgling Union of Soviet Socialist Republics could not but become an overwhelmingly important focus of attention in the world socialist movement. Socialists in every country now divided sharply in their attitudes toward the

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Soviet Union. One group, seeing in it the hope for the future, generated a passionate loyalty which extended to the blind acceptance not only of Soviet leadership but also of Soviet institutional and ideological patterns. To this group, Stalinism was the pure milk of Marxism, applicable not only to the special conditions of the USSR but to all socialist movements and countries now and forevermore. The other main group into which world socialism divided were horrified and repelled by what they saw in the USSR and turned against it as the main enemy of socialist advance. Like the first group, however, these socialists also failed to distinguish between developments in the USSR which would have accompanied any socialist revolution and those which were specifically due to the particular conditions prevailing in that country at that time. Instead, they attributed the abhorrent features of Soviet society to revolution in general and assumed that the same consequences must necessarily follow any revolution that might take place in the future. They therefore abandoned Marxism altogether or, which comes to the same thing, repudiated its revolutionary essence.

The paradoxical result of this split in the world socialist movement was that substantially all socialists—there were of course exceptions, but politically they were of no consequence—came to regard the Soviet Union as the paradigm of revolutionary socialism and Stalinism as its inevitable political and ideological superstructure. And this view was readily accepted outside the socialist movement, the more so since it fitted neatly into the requirements of bourgeois propaganda.

That this particular constellation of historical facts placed powerful impediments in the way of the sound and rapid growth of a socialist movement in the developed capitalist countries should be obvious. The economic performance of the Soviet Union was, to be sure, most remarkable. But given that the standard of living under socialism was still far lower than in the advanced areas of the West, the fact of rapid economic growth made little impression as yet upon the working masses under capitalism. And quite naturally, many intellectuals, students, artists, etc., whose objective interests are so strongly linked to the victory of socialism, were disoriented and repelled

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by the Stalinist superstructure of the USSR. If socialism must be like that, they reasoned, then we want no part of it. At the same time, the anti-Soviet socialist parties, having lost their revolutionary zeal and standing for nothing more than a few reforms in an inhuman and corrupt system, likewise lacked the power to generate enthusiasm among their followers, still less to attract any large body of new adherents. For all these reasons, the era of Stalinism was an era of disunity and stagnation for the socialist movement in the advanced capitalist countries.

This era is now coming to a close. It may well be, indeed, that historians of the future will date its end at the 22nd Congress. Khrushchev's first anti-Stalinist speech at the 20th Congress was never officially published; and Hungary and its aftermath seemed, at least to many socialists in the West, to mark a considerable reversion to Stalinist methods. But the renewal of the de-Stalinization campaign in the full light of publicity at the 22nd Congress is quite certainly an irreversible step. In his closing address to the Congress, Khrushchev, speaking with all the gravity required by the occasion, made the following statement:

> Stalin is no longer among the living, but we considered it necessary to denounce the disgraceful methods of leadership that flourished in the atmosphere of the cult of his person. Our Party does this to ensure that such practices never recur.

This time, at any rate, we have no reason to doubt either his sincerity or the overwhelming support which the policy of de-Stalinization enjoys in the CPUSSR and among the Soviet people generally.

It is too early to attempt to assess all the consequences for the socialist movement in the advanced capitalist countries, and no doubt many of these consequences will be a long time in appearing. But certain things are already clear. Stalinism is *not* the inevitable superstructure of socialist revolution; on the contrary, it is a transitory phenomenon which owes its existence to very special historical conditions. No honest person can any longer believe that the logical outcome of socialist development is a nightmare of the kind described in Orwell's *1984;* the communist society projected for 1980 in the Program of the 22nd

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Congress is both totally different and entirely credible. Socialist revolution does *not* destroy the ends it seeks; no socialist from now on need have any doubts about the *possibility* of combining the overthrow of capitalism with the retention of the great achievements of the capitalist era.

Once these truths are widely recognized, as they are bound to be sooner or later, it ought to be possible to lay the foundations for a new, stronger, and above all united socialist movement in the countries of the West where socialism was born and cradled. And when the Soviet Union actually begins to forge ahead of Western Europe and the United States in living standards, as there is every reason to believe it will, why shouldn't this united movement be able to attract the dedicated mass following which Western socialism so conspicuously lacked during the greater part of the Stalinist era?

One final reflection in this connection: Professor Baran, in his contribution to this symposium, suggests that the great disparity between the levels of development in the USSR and the underdeveloped countries of the world may produce a sort of estrangement which could result in Moscow's losing its position as capital of the world's revolutionary socialist movement to Peking. That is certainly a very real possibility. If the foregoing analysis is sound, however, we should now add another possibility: as the Soviet Union catches up with and surpasses the developed capitalist countries, Moscow may once again become the spiritual and moral leader of an international socialist movement, this time centered not in the underdeveloped areas of the world but in the advanced countries of Western Europe and North America.

That elusive entity "human nature" has varied so much from country to country and from century to century that it is difficult not to regard it as a historical phenomenon shaped by prevailing social conditions and conventions.

—E. H. Carr, What Is History?

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WORLD EVENTS

By Scott Nearing

Socialism in East Europe

Eight East European countries (beside the Soviet Union) are preoccupied with socialist construction. They are Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Poland, Rumania, and Yugoslavia. Between December, 1961, and April, 1962, we spent 14 weeks in these countries, regretfully omitting Albania because our U.S. passports read "not valid for travel to or in Albania."

Three months spread over East Europe's half a million square miles, with its 115 million inhabitants, can give only a bird's eye view of so large a panorama. We wish the time had been far longer, because the achievements that we observed there deserve the most careful consideration and the widest publicity.

Versailles treaty-makers (in 1919) partitioned the unwieldy Austro-Hungarian Empire into a line of independent states (several of them monarchies), set up as a barrier against the advance of Bolshevism into Central and Western Europe. The newly created German Weimar Republic was a part of this defense line.

East Europe was predominantly agricultural, exchanging its farm surpluses for the manufactures of Western industrial centers. Except on the better-run large estates, farming methods were primitive. Per acre agricultural yields were low, and the small tenants and farm laborers were ruthlessly exploited by the big landowners.

War broke out once again in 1939. Many East European cities were ruined, railway bridges and equipment were badly damaged, fruit trees were uprooted, forests were felled. War's end in 1945 found East Europe economically prostrated and politically disorganized, its population decimated by war losses and victimized by the sense of uncertainty and insecurity which follows years of military struggle.

East Europeans faced three problems. They had to repair war damage, wipe out feudal survivals, and discover a future

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way of life that would make peace and friendly relations both possible and probable.

The tempo of improvement has differed from country to country. Most war wreckage was cleared up in the first half dozen years. Additional years were required to eliminate feudal survivals. By the early 1950's East Europe was busily building socialism. Our report deals chiefly with the achievements of the past decade.

Changes in Property and Class Relations

All through the present century, revolutionary groups have been active in East Europe. Since the revolutionaries were dealing with populations composed largely of small farmers, farm tenants, and laborers on the big estates, land reform usually topped their demands. By the time wholesale warfare had shattered East Europe's feudal survivals and crumpled up the structure of its budding capitalism, land reform was under way in countries like Yugoslavia. During subsequent years, property relations in East Europe have been fundamentally altered.

Without exception the avowed purpose of the changes has been an end to the age-old exploitation which had made it possible for able-bodied landowners to live idly on the labor power of the land workers. Unanimous agreement on this central purpose did not prevent considerable differences in its practical application.

(1) Large estates were broken up all over East Europe. Limited amounts of land were allotted to individual farmers and farm laborers. Forests and mines generally became state property. Large estates which had been efficiently worked with modern methods were often made into state farms. Some land was assigned to co-operating groups. Buildings which had belonged to the estate owners became state property and were put to various public uses. Tools and machines went to those who proposed to cultivate the soil. Properties of enemy aliens and collaborators were confiscated.

(2) Privately owned utilities were taken over. Industries and other establishments employing more than three, five, or seven workers followed suit, unless the enterprises were collective. Banks and other financial institutions were state operated.

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These measures pulled the economic foundations from under both feudal and capitalist exploitation and created the Public Sector of East Europe's economy. In the East European socialist states the Public Sector dominates the economy. Yugoslavia and Poland are possible exceptions.

(3) The Social Sector consists of cooperative or collective enterprises. These include consumer and producer cooperatives in industry, trade, and agriculture. In largely agricultural countries like Bulgaria and Poland they play a major role in the economy. They have developed to a considerable extent all over East Europe.

(4) The Private Sector exists in every nook and cranny of East European economy. It is found in consumer soft goods such as food, clothing, sports equipment, and in consumer hard goods from houses, autos, bicycles, iceboxes, and radio sets, to tools and other equipment for the personal use of the owner. Generally all such items can be sold, given away, or bequeathed by the owner.

Dwelling space is still in short supply and the size of dwellings is limited by law. But in all of the East European countries a family may buy or rent land, borrow money from public authorities to build a private house, subject of course to zoning regulations. The house is private property and may be used or sold as its owners see fit. It may also be rented under some restrictions.

Beside this very large domestic sector of the private economy, there are the farms still operated by individual farmers. Such farms are few and far between in Bulgaria, Rumania, and Hungary. But in other East European countries they aggregate millions of private enterprises, reaching a maximum in Poland where they include 90 percent of all agricultural land.

Individual plots on collective farms are another important part of the private sector. These plots usually include about one acre (206 by 206 feet) of cultivable land per household. This land is sometimes cultivated individually, sometimes collectively, but the produce belongs to the individual family. In addition to this plot, each family has a barnyard in which it keeps one cow, one horse, one or two pigs, one or two sheep, poultry, and bees.

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Another very large sector of the private economy consists of stores, shops, and workshops, operated by the proprietor and members of his family. There were millions of these establishments all over East Europe before the building of socialism began and there are millions of them still functioning. They are at a minimum in Bulgaria and Rumania, and at a maximum in Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and East Germany. Proprietors may employ help, but taxes increase rapidly and progressively with the numbers of workers employed.

The Public and Social Sectors together predominate in every East European state, particularly if their weight is measured by the amount of goods and services they put on the market; but in use terms and in population terms, the Private Sector is generally significant even when it is not dominant.

Social and Economic Planning

Destruction and death, spread across the continent in one generation by two major wars and several minor ones, has had a profound effect upon the outlook of East European survivors. First, they are anti-war and pro-peace because they know war's horrors and miseries at first hand. Second, they are attempting to organize a form of society (socialism) in which they believe war will be unlikely if not impossible. In order to achieve this purpose they have turned to their scientists and engineers with the demand that they plan and organize a war-free society.

Scientists and engineers are used to tough assignments—constructing, transporting, mining, supplying, administering. This new assignment may be the toughest of all because in the period of written history planning has stopped with small units: clans, tribes, cities. Nations and empires have grown in the hurly-burly of economic and military competition. When Lenin, in 1920, proposed a plan to have the Soviet Union totally electrified by 1970, world leaders laughed. "What," they exclaimed, "electrify a backward country stretching across two continents in half a century? It is impossible! More Bolshevik propaganda!" The first tentative Soviet plans, issued a few years later, met similar scorn and derision from people "in the know."

East European socialist countries began planning only

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three decades ago, in the 1940's. By the late 1950's they had matured their plans and had their economies under control. Production and consumption were in reasonable balance. Amounts paid out in wages and salaries were matched by goods and services awaiting purchasers. Exports paid for imports. Investment funds came out of income. As the decade advanced, borrowing from abroad tapered off. Several countries such as Rumania, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia began selling exports on long-term credits—a form of lending.

We shall not soon forget the elation we felt in talking with the younger East European economists who were busy with planning. Some of them were only a few years out of college. In that brief time they had mastered their facts and their techniques. They manipulated their economies as a towerman in a big railroad yard manipulates traffic. One of them said:

> We have reached the point where we have no recessions, no unemployed. We handle our economy as the general director in a big private enterprise handles his business. He is a planner aiming at profits; we are raising our production levels by 7 or 8 percent each year, investing a fixed proportion of our gross income, guaranteeing our people against economic insecurity, and raising the standard of living each year by planned percentages. It is only three or four years since we worked out these controls, but today they are as much a matter of course as fixing price levels and interest rates among the monopoly capitalists.

"Of course we make miscalculations and mistakes," they all admitted. "Such errors are unfortunately present in every branch of engineering. As we broaden our experience and sharpen our skills, errors should be reduced to a minimum."

Thirty years before these words were uttered the countries under discussion had been dependencies of West European empires, paying for their high-priced manufactured goods with cheap agricultural products. The turn came less than twenty years ago. In that brief period all of the East European socialists have begun to export specialized manufactures in exchange for necessary imports. Compared with the tortured economic experience of Argentina, Mexico, and other Latin American countries, trying for a century to stabilize their

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economies and win economic independence along private enterprise lines, the East European experience of the past decade is little short of miraculous.

Planning is being used at all levels—national, regional, district, local. There is not an enterprise in East Europe, not a town or village without its planning commission or committee. Planning is part and parcel of the day-to-day experience of East European socialists.

Industrialization

Essential to sound planning is the correct balance between energy sources, heavy industry, machine construction, and the maintenance of quantity and quality in consumer goods and services. Starting from a base of backward agriculture, the builders of East European socialism have aimed at a substantial degree of mechanization and industrialization throughout the economy. The priorities which guided their policies have been: (1) energy, particularly electric energy; (2) heavy industry such as steel and chemicals; (3) machine building; and (4) consumer goods and services. With this priority scale the advances in industrialization have been rapid and sure. Today, in East European states that were predominantly agricultural only a dozen years ago, the industrial sector stands head and shoulders above the remainder of the economy.

Industry has been planned in the main. Agriculture (outside of the state farms) has not been planned. Collective farms are still voluntary associations from which individual members may withdraw at will. Each collective farm makes its own plans. While industry is coordinated, agriculture is decentralized and fragmented.

The 1961 *Survey* of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe shows an increase in East European industrial output of about 9 percent over 1960. These rates were near to plan. In agriculture, except for Poland, production was well below the planned levels, and below the increases in industry.

East European economy has been revolutionized in more ways than one during the past dozen years. Today it is approaching a socialist equilibrium.

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WHERE WE STAND

BY THE EDITORS

During the early years of the 20th century the subject of socialism was widely and eagerly discussed in the United States. Eugene V. Debs, socialist candidate for president, polled close to 1,000,000 votes in 1912—the equivalent of approximately 3,000,000 votes in the 1948 election. The popular interest in socialism was reflected in an enormous sale of socialist literature. *The Appeal to Reason,* a weekly, had a circulation of more than 300,000 for several years; pamphlets by Oscar Ameringer were printed in editions of hundreds of thousands; books by Bellamy, Upton Sinclair, and Jack London ranked with the best-sellers of the day.

This widespread interest in socialism has declined to such an extent that today it would probably not be an exaggeration to say that for the great majority of Americans "socialism" is little more than a dirty word. This is an extraordinary situation because it occurs at the very moment that a large proportion of the rest of the world is moving toward socialism at an unprecedentedly rapid rate. It is a deeply disturbing situation because there are still many Americans who believe with us that, in the long run, socialism will prove to be the only solution to the increasingly serious economic and social problems that face the United States.

It is because we hold firmly to this belief that we are founding MONTHLY REVIEW, an independent magazine devoted to analyzing, from a socialist point of view, the most significant trends in domestic and foreign affairs.

By "socialism" we mean a system of society with two fundamental characteristics: first, public ownership of the decisive sectors of the economy, and second, comprehensive planning of production for the benefit of the producers themselves.

The possibility and workability of such a system of society

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are no longer open to doubt. Socialism became a reality with the introduction of the First Five Year Plan in Soviet Russia in 1928; its power to survive was demonstrated by the subsequent economic achievements of the USSR during the '30s, and finally, once and for all, in the war against Nazi Germany. These facts —and they are facts which no amount of wishful thinking can conjure away—give to the USSR a unique importance in the development of socialism and in the history of our time.

We find completely unrealistic the view of those who call themselves socialists, yet imagine that socialism can be built on an international scale by fighting it where it already exists. This is the road to war, not to socialism. On the other hand, we do not accept the view that the USSR is above criticism simply because it is socialist. We believe in, and shall be guided by, the principle that the cause of socialism has everything to gain and nothing to lose from a full and frank discussion of shortcomings, as well as accomplishments, of socialist countries and socialist parties everywhere.

We shall follow the development of socialism all over the world, but we want to emphasize that our major concern is less with socialism abroad than with socialism at home. We are convinced that the sooner the United States is transformed from a capitalist to a socialist society, the better it will be, not only for Americans, but for all mankind.

We believe that there are already many Americans who share this attitude with us and that their number will steadily increase. We ask for their financial support, their assistance in extending our circulation, and their advice as to how MONTHLY REVIEW can best serve the cause of socialism in the United States.

Clarity about the aims and problems of socialism is of greatest significance in our age of transition. Since, under present circumstances, free and unhindered discussion of these problems has come under a powerful taboo, I consider the founding of this magazine to be an important public service.

PROFESSOR ALBERT EINSTEIN
in his article "Why Socialism?" in Vol. I, No. 1

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

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British Guiana's three daily papers are bitterly hostile to the Jagan regime. So is the single radio station. Dr. Jagan's elected government relies upon one crudely printed, totally inadequate weekly paper to explain its position to the people, and thus the new budget, designed to develop a home industry and to raise the standard of living, was actually made to appear a step backward by the anti-independence, reactionary opposition.

A political movement or government without the means to convey its program to the broadest masses of the people operates under a severe handicap. Friends of British Guiana in this country have accordingly determined to provide Dr. Jagan's movement, the People's Progressive Party, with a linotype machine, photoengraving equipment, and other essential printing machinery to enable it to meet its important political obligations.

We invite MR readers to join in making a democratic daily newspaper possible for these embattled friends of democracy. Only a few thousand dollars are needed, part of which has already been raised. A committee has been formed to give the campaign a final push. Help if you can.

LEO HUBERMAN, Provisional Chairman,
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(*continued from inside back cover*)

The disgraceful persecution of the American Communist Party under the McCarran Act shows no signs of abating. The great liberals who preside over our destinies in Washington are thus crawling on their bellies to appease the John Birchers whom they profess to abhor. Any one who wants a brief, lucid, and accurate account of the "legal" methods involved in this scandalous exhibition of cowardice and immorality cannot do better than get hold of (and then distribute to others) the pamphlet entitled "The Rape of the First Amendment" by Alexander L. Crosby (see p. 19 of this issue), just published by the Emergency Civil Liberties Committee, 421 Seventh Avenue, New York 1, N. Y. The price is 25¢ for single copies, 15¢ apiece in lots of 100 or more.

MR's anniversary meeting, usually scheduled for May, will be held on June 4th this year. The main speaker will be MR Associates' chairman J. Raymond Walsh, whom many readers will remember for his inspiring news broadcasts in the years immediately following World War II. Dr. Walsh has taught at Harvard and Williams, and for several years held a high staff position in the CIO under the presidency of Philip Murray. He will discuss what is happening on the New Frontier. Corliss Lamont will be in the chair; and Paul Sweezy, who will have recently returned from a visit to Mexico, will report on Mexico and the Alliance for Progress. The meeting will be held in the air-conditioned Riviera Terrace on Broadway near 53rd Street. Readers in the New York area have already received a notice in the mail, so the box below, giving details, is your last reminder. We are expecting a capacity attendance, so be sure to get your tickets well in advance.

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(*continued from inside front cover*)

important message of socialism. But this we cannot do unless we can greatly expand our circulation among them.

With this in mind, we have decided to make the following offer to present MR readers, most of whom sincerely share our concern: you can send a *one-year gift sub at the specially reduced rate of only $3 per year,* to begin with the September issue when the 1962-63 school season opens to (1) your own alma mater—either your high school or college library, or (2) *any* school or college student. In case we find that a library for which a gift sub comes in is already a subscriber, we will substitute another not heavily endowed (e.g. a Negro college), which is not a subscriber. Past experience proves that a large proportion of those who receive gift subs renew under their own steam. We are therefore *certain* that this method will add new young subscribers to our rolls. How many depends entirely on you.

Beginning with this issue, MR is joining with two dozen other "small" magazines in a scheme to secure wider national distribution. What are called "Egghead Reading Centers" are being set up around the country at various bookstores and newsstands, to handle the 25 magazines. To begin with, there are 47 such centers in 41 cities and towns, and the hope is that the number will expand rapidly. We're keeping our fingers crossed while fervently hoping that this is the answer to the question of how to get genuinely national newsstand distribution. If you know of an outlet that you think could handle MR but is not doing so at present, please inform the manager that he can now get the magazine from his jobber or wholesaler.

Under the heading "One Man Between Two Worlds," *Newsweek* of April 23rd ran a four-column story on Claude Eatherly, including the information that "the Anders-Eatherly letters will be brought out in a few weeks by the Monthly Review Press." The title of the correspondence, as you know, is *Burning Conscience,* and publication is now set for June 4th. May we remind you that after June 4th the price of *Burning Conscience* will be $4 and that until June 4th it is only $2.25? We want all MR readers to have the book at the prepublication price.

Last month we announced in a double-spread ad a number of special MR Press book bargains. The response has been beyond expectation. Since the offers hold until June 1, we are repeating the ad this month (pp. 32-33). *Take advantage of it.*

In this space in a recent issue we called attention to one of the few good reviews our *Cuba* book received. A reader has called attention to another, which we carelessly overlooked and which we are equally glad to recognize: it was by D. H. Stewart of the University of Michigan and appeared in the *Queen's Quarterly* (Ontario), Winter 1961.

Florence Luscomb has been a veteran fighter for good causes ever since the crusade for women's suffrage early in this century; and she has never been more active than today. To celebrate her 75th birthday, which falls in 1962, a group of her friends are planning to raise money to pay her passage to the next meeting of the World Peace Council, to be held in Japan on the anniversary of Hiroshima Day. The editors of MR have known Florence Luscomb for many years, on occasion worked with her, always admired her. We would like to urge all MR readers to join in honoring a great and gallant lady, and we take this opportunity to wish her a very happy birthday and many more years of fruitful activity. Checks should be made out to Florence H. Luscomb Travel Fund and sent to Mrs. Emerson F. Moseley, Neck Lane, Centerville, Mass.

(*continued on page* 64)

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